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The years after 1815 presented Americin businessmen with steadily 
increasing opportunities. The rapid growth of population-it quadrupled 
between 1815 and 1860-created an ever larger market for manufactures. 
Much of this market remained accessible (as it had been in the colonial 
period) to ships that plied the coastal waters and navigable rivers of the 
seaboard. As territorial expansion drew more and more people farther 
inland, proliferating transportation networks-turnpikes, inland rivers, 
canals, and then railroads-tied the new interior settlements to the national 
commerce. 
Ambitious entrepreneurs responded to the challenge of the bur- 
geoning market, and by the outbreak of the Civil War the creation of 
modern industrial America was well underway. Manufacturing in 18 15 was 
an inconsequential element of the U.S. economy, carried on largely in tiny 
shops producing small lots; by 1860 manufacturing generated a third of 
the national income, much of it in a network of factories and mills en- 
gaged in large batch or continous mass production. This growth in the 
capacity and sophistication of U.S. manufacturing resulted from a fusion 
of the technological skills of mechanics and artisans with the commercial 
talents of merchants. Practitioners of the new sciences of machine tech- 
nology and production designed the factories and devised ways to run 
them; masters of the ancient arts of trade, commerce, and investment 
supplied the money to build and operate factories. They also provided the 
combination of skills needed to market the rising tide of production. 
*This paper is a somewhat altered version of a chapter in a book 
forthcoming in the Fall from the Johns Hopkms Press: Glenn Porter and 
Harold C. Livesay, Merchants and Manufacturers: Studies in the Changing 
Structure of Nineteenth-Century Marketing. 
This union of competencies proved ideally suited to the problems of 
the early U.S. economy. Consequently, virtually every ante-bellum manu- 
facturing firm which successfully produced for markets outside its local 
area developed as a partnership between merchants and manufacturers. In 
almost all such cases the merchants dominated the partnership. Sometimes 
they did so by virtue of the fact that they perceived the potential of a 
growing market and established a manufacturing unit to meet the new 
demand. In these cases merchants controlled the firm from the beginning. 
In other instances mercantile dominance evolved from a manufacturer’s 
decision to expand into outlying markets. Ambitious producers, no matter 
how great their technical skills, inevitably encountered problems of 
finance and commerce that only a partnership (fomral or informal) with 
established merchants could solve. 
First among the fledgling manufacturers’ quandaries was the need for 
capital. Fixed (or “long-term”) capital was required to buy land, buildings, 
and machinery, the “fixed assets” necessary for production. Successive 
moves toward expansion, or the need to replace obsolete plant and equip- 
ment, required repeated commitments of long-term capital. 
An even more vexing difficulty was the need for short-term (“work- 
ing”) capital to buy raw materials, pay wages, and meet other current 
operating costs such as taxes, advertising, transportation, loan interest, etc. 
Finally, doing business in distant markets with customers whose 
probity was unknown involved severe risks not encountered in selling 
locally. These included the dangers of extending credit to distant clients, 
and in securing payment in funds or notes negotiable at or near par locally. 
Surviving records demonstrate conclusively that virtually all ante- 
bellum manufacturers encountered these problems and turned to mer- 
chants for help. The merchants responded, but they did so selectively, thus 
exercising the power of life or death over individual enterprises. By choos- 
ing which firms to support, the merchants turned the rising power of the 
machine to their own ends. Using the crass force of their capital and the 
cunning finesse of their craft, they exacted a stiff price for their aid: 
interest, discounts, commissions, but above all the price of control. They 
controlled the destiny of the tinkerers: Oliver Evans built a steam wagon 
and an automated mill; for want of capital his memory rests in the fragile 
hands of technology buffs. Samuel Colt made a pistol; his mercantile 
creditors saw him through to commemoration in frontier folklore, malt 
liquor, and professional baseball. 
But merchants controlled not only the fate of individual enterprises; 
they often dictated policy to the survivors, deciding what was made, where 
it went, and on what terms it was sold. Control did not endure, of course. 
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In time the machine devoured the merchants as it devoured everything 
else. On the eve of the Civil War there were already signs of the deteriora- 
tion of the merchants’ hegemony, but it is a tribute to the merchants’ skill 
that they adapted their ancient craft so readily to the needs of the ma- 
chine age. Here, in a few brief case studies, is how they did it. 
Merchants as Sources of Long Term Investment &pita1 
Most early manufacturing firms were proprietorships or small partner- 
ships. The owners were usually men of limited means. Assembling the 
fixed assets to commence production often absorbed all the proprietors’ 
resources. Additional fixed capital was extremely difficult to raise. Equity 
financing through the mass sale of securities did not begin in the United 
States until the railroads, and never played a significant role in manu- 
facturing finance before the Civil War.’ 
Financial institutions such as banks and insurance companies were of 
limited utility as sources of long-term capital. Banks would occasionally 
make long-term loans to manufacturers, but only on the presentation of 
strong collateral. They did not make unsecured loans on business pros- 
pects, however glowing. In the first decade of the nineteenth century, for 
example, the Bank of New York supplied capital for the construction of a 
Peterson, New Jersey textile mill, but the entire amount of the loan was 
secured by U.S. government bonds.’ 
Mortgages on real estate were another acceptable form of security. In 
the 1820’s and 1830’s, Washburn and Godard, a Worcester, Mass. wire and 
nails producing firm, obtained long-term capital from a Worcester savings 
bank. The bank in turn held a mortgage on the firm’s machine shop, and 
on the mill owners’ real estate.3 In 1856 the Baltimore ironmaster S. S. 
Keyser got funds to build a warehouse by mortgaging his family’s property 
to a local bank.4 Such conservative lending policies seem to have been 
typical of most sound eastern banks throughout the period. In 1856, for 
i Thomas R. Navin and Marian V. Sears, “The Rise of a Market for 
Industrial Securities, 1887-1902,” Business History Review, 29 (1955), 
105138. 
*Joseph J. Klein, “The Development of Mercantile Instruments of 
Credit in the United States,” Journal of’ Accountancy, 12 (19 1 l), 437. 
3Washburn and Godard Bill Book, Inventory and Record, 
1822-l 848, American Steel and Wire MSS, Baker Library, Harvard Univer- 
sity. 
4Credit report on S.S. Keyser & Co., in Baltimore, Md., vol. 8, pp. 
12, 397. Dun and Bradstreet MSS, Baker Library, Harvard University. 
These volumes are hereafter cited “D. and B.” MSS, and contain dozens of 
similar examples. 
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example, the Savings Bank of Baltimore had $190,000 outstanding in 
long-term industrial loans, all of it secured by real estate, bank stock, or 
U.S. government bonds.’ 
Insurance companies, like savings banks, were in the business of pool- 
ing individuals’ savings and investing them at a profit. Insurance firms 
were, however, even less inclined than banks to make manufacturing loans. 
Refusing a loan request submitted by the Shawmut Fibre Company of 
Shawmut, Massachusetts an officer of the Union Mutual Life Insurance 
Company commented that his firm had stopped making such loans “long 
ago.” He added, “It is the custom of our company, which has become 
practically a law with us, that we do not loan on manufacturing establish- 
ments.“6 
Massachusetts Hospital Life Insurance Company, which opened for 
business in 1818, invested heavily in the stock of New England textile 
mills and made large loans to individual stockholders in textile firms, but 
made few other investments in manufacturing. Massachusetts Life’s partici- 
pation in textile financing is doubtless explained by the fact that its list of 
stockholders consisted of names such as Lawrence, Lowell, Jackson, 
Cabot, Appleton, and other prominent New England merchants.’ These 
were, of course, the same families that owned controlling interest in the 
textile mills, and thus the merchants were in effect lending to themselves 
by siphoning funds from one family enterprise into another. This pattern 
of a merchant-controlled financial institution underwriting its stock- 
holders’ industrial investments, while refusing loans to other manufactur- 
ing proprietors and partners, was a commonplace in the period. It was one 
of the principal ways in which merchants were able to control ante-bellum 
manufacturing development. 
Modern industrial firms secure long-term capital for expansion or 
modernization by tapping the savings of the general public. They do so 
through mass sales of securities, or through loans from financial institu- 
tions such as banks and insurance companies. Since neither of these 
methods was open to most preCivi1 War entrepreneurs, growth depended 
5 Peter L. Payne and Lance E. Davis, The Savings Bank of Baltimore 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1956). 
‘Josiah Drummond to Alexander H. Rice, October 21, 1889. 
Shawmut Fibre Co. Papers, Baker Library, Harvard University. 
7GeraId T. White, A History of ihe Massachusetts Hospital Life In- 
surance Company (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, I955), 
PP. 41-55, 85-104. For the most comprehensive discussion of textile mills’ 
financing, see Lance E. Davis, “The New England Textile M& and the 
Capital Markets: A Study of Industrial Borrowing, 1840-1860,” Journal of 
Economic History, 20 (1967), l-30. 
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upon personal resources and retained earnings (both of which were usually 
inadequate), or upon financial assistance from wealthy merchants. In such 
circumstances it is not surprising that many of the most successful firms 
were either those founded by the merchants themselves, or those in which 
the entrepreneur was able to secure funds for fixed capital assets through 
an alliance with members of the mercantile community. 
Throughout the preCivi1 War period merchants controlled most of the 
capital available in the United States. Many built large personal fortunes 
through trade based on the American agricultural economy. Baltimore 
merchant Robert Oliver, for example, made a net profit of $775,000 in 
1806-07 through trade with Vera Cruz alone.8 Merchants also had access 
to additional funds through credit at home and abroad. Unlike manufac- 
turers, who could obtain bank loans only on tangible collateral, prosperous 
merchants could borrow extensively from commercial banks, often on their 
signatures alone. This seeming paradox is explained by the prevailing 
philosophy of American bankers who, unlike their British counterparts, 
viewed personal wealth as a security superior to any form of commercial 
paper,’ and by the fact that merchants usually were the banks. An analysis 
of the directors and officers of the banks of New York, Philadelphia, and 
Baltimore in 1840, 1850, and 1860 reveals that more than two-thirds of 
the officials were or had been merchants. The same was true of virtually all 
of the private bankers in those cities. lo Middlemen therefore had access 
both to accumulated mercantile profits and the savings deposits of the 
general public. 
Merchants not only had resources, they were also accustomed to seek- 
ing profitable ways to keep them employed; they were professional risk- 
takers. Indeed, as many historians have noted, successful merchants seem 
perpetually driven to find employment for surplus funds. 
In previous centuries this drive had led merchants such as the Fuggers 
and Rothschilds into banking. Others had poured their profits back into 
trade, buying and selling more goods, and building more ships to haul 
‘Stuart Bruchey, Robert Oliver, Merchant of Baltimore, 1783-1819 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1956), Chapter 6. 
‘Fritz Redlich, The Molding of American Banking (New York: 
Johnson Reprint, 1968), I. 47-48. 
i” I analyzed the occupational origins of bankers by compiling a list of 
their names from the appropriate commercial and city directories and 
checking their backgrounds in city directories, local histories, etc. 
Among many biographies of merchants who turned bankers are 
Richard H. Hart, Enoch Pratt (Baltimore: Enoch Pratt Free Library, 
1935), and John Bach MacMaster, The Life und Times of Stephen Girard 
(Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1918). 
68 Explorations in Economic History 
them in. Expanded trade of necessity required larger markets, and this 
dynamic led Nicolo Polo and his successors to travel about the world 
themselves, and to finance explorations searching for trading routes and 
markets in the Indies. 
Many American merchants followed these traditional paths in the 
early nineteenth century. Stephen Girard of Philadelphia became an 
enormously wealthy private banker. Merchant families such as the Jack- 
sons and Lees of Boston built world-wide trading networks with branch 
houses in India and China. The need for greater market coverage made 
merchants the driving force behind early internal improvements such as 
the Erie and Chesapeake and Delaware Canals. 
Many merchants, however, found an outlet for their surplus capital in 
manufacturing finance. Some, like Francis Cabot Lowell, did so at first 
because the Napoleonic Wars and the War of 1812 made reinvestment in 
foreign trade impractical. Lowell had been to England, and he realized the 
potential profits in textile manufacutring. Once he and his assoicates 
demonstrated the profitability of textile enterprises, other merchants were 
quick to make similar investments. 
Some of these traders turned to manufacturing investment because of 
the changing American market. Population growth presented greater trad- 
ing opportunities at home, and the advance of merchanization widened the 
market for manufacturers. In selecting their investments, merchants used 
their knowledge of expanding domestic markets, and usually financed those 
manufacturing fields for which their own trading regions were particularly 
suited in terms of natural resources, skilled labor, and transportation 
facilities. For example, Pennsylvania merchants who underwrote the 
state’s iron industry included: the Trotter family of Philadelphia which 
dealt in tin and copper, but invested heavily in the Lehigh Crane Iron 
Works; Richard Wood, Charles Wood, and Edward Townsend, Philadelphia 
dry goods merchants who took over the bankrupt Cambria Iron Works and 
hired John Fritz to resuscitate it; and, of course, the Pittsburgh pork 
packer turned iron dealer, James Laughlin, who financed Benjamin Jones’ 
rolling mill. 
Many specialized merchants invested in firms that produced the 
particular types of goods that they sold. ‘r In effect, this was a loose form 
l1 For a succinct discussion of the rise of merchants who specialized 
either in commodity or function, and their significance to the antebellum 
economy, see Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., “The Role of Business in the United 
States: A Historical Survey,” Duedulus, 98 (1969), 23-31. The most com- 
mon types of functionally specialized merchants were “jobbers,” who 
usually took title to the goods they sold, and “commission merchants,” 
who usually did not. 
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of backward integration which assured continuing supplies in expanding 
markets, and decreased their dependence on overseas producers. Anson 
Phelps of New York supplemented his supply of copper and brass wares by 
supporting factories in the Connecticut Valley. David Reeves of Phila- 
delphia used profits he made importing British rails to start the first in- 
tegrated American rail mill, Phoenix Iron. 
Merchants supplied long-term capital to these and many other enter- 
prises. Some firms they founded themselves, and then engaged technicians 
to build and operate the factories. In others their involvement resulted 
from the initiative of an artisan who sought mercantile capital to start a 
new firm, or to buttress an existing one. The outstanding examples of the 
first case were the Waltham and Lowell textile mills, and integrated rolling 
mills such as Cambria and Phoenix-the largest manufacturing enterprises 
of their times. Merchants created these firms by forming corporations and 
selling stock privately to a few colleagues. Because many of these firms 
prospered, and because many of their histories have been written, this type 
of merchant capitalism is better known, but was in fact the less frequent 
of the two.12 
The second case, in which an established craftsman became a manu- 
facturer and financed expansion through an alliance with wealthy mer- 
chants, occurred far more often. Sometimes these alliances took the form 
of a closely held stock corporation; often they were a formal or informal 
partnership. Whitaker Iron (the forerunner of Wheeling Steel) illustrates 
the corporate method. In the 1840’s George and Joseph Whitaker, the 
Maryland ironmasters who controlled Principio Furnace, financed their 
firm’s growth by securing capital from the Baltimore merchants Thomas 
Garrett and William Chandler. The new firm issued 4,000 shares of stock. 
The Whitakers owned 2400; the merchants 1600. r3 
Firms established or built as partnerships between merchants and 
mechanics dominated many nineteenth century manufacturing industries. 
Among these was the railway equipment industry, in which a handful of 
firms founded before the Civil War survived competition and recession to 
account for most of the industry’s output. Included in this group of major 
l2 Victor S. Clark commented, “Commerce supplied capital to 
manufacturing in two ways: by the direct investment and by credits to 
industrial companies. The latter way, although less conspicuous, was 
probably the more important of the two.” Clark, History of Manufactures, 
I, 368. 
l3 Minutes of Stockholders Meeting, 1842, 1843, 1844; Statement of 
Stock, Principio Furnace, 184 1, both in Principio Furnace Papers, Mary- 
land Historical Society, Baltimore Md. This collection henceforth cited 
“Principio MSS.” 
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producers were the Lobdell Car Wheel Company, and Harlan and Hollings- 
worth (car builders) of Wilmington, Delaware; Rogers Locomotive and 
Machine Works of Paterson, New Jersey; and Baldwin Locomotive Works 
and Norris Locomotive Works, both of Philadelphia. 
The first three of these firms enjoyed mercantile capital at their incep- 
tion. The Lobdell Car Wheel Company began in 1830 as a partnership 
between Jonothan Bonney and Charles Bush. Bonney was a founder and 
iron worker who learned his trade at the pioneering Mt. Savage Iron Works 
in Maryland. Bush was a member of one of Wilmington’s oldest and 
wealthiest mercantile families. His father supplied the original capital for 
the firm, and the Bush family’s wealth played a crucial role in the sub- 
sequent growth of the firm.14 
Rogers, Ketcham, and Grosvenor, the predecessor firm of Rogers 
Locomotive Works, produced its first unit in 1837. The firm combined the 
mechanical talents of the machinist Thomas Rogers with the wealth and 
mercantile talents of Morris Ketcham, a New York banker and mer- 
chant. r5 
Samuel Pusey, a journeyman machinist, and Samuel Harlan, a cabinet- 
maker, built their first railroad cars in 1836. They benefited from the 
financial resources of the third partner, Mahlon Betts. Betts, a member of 
a Quaker mercantile family, was a director of the Bank of Wilmington and 
Brandywine and the Savings Bank of Wilmington, as well as of three rail- 
roads: the Wilmington and Susquehanna, the Delaware and Maryland, and 
the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore. l6 
14See Harold C. Livesay, “The Lobdell Car Wheel Co.,” Business 
History Review, 42 (1968), 171-194. The Mount Savage Iron Works where 
Bonney trained Pioneered in making iron equipment for railroads. It rolled 
its first rails in the 1830’s, and T rails by 1844. It was also one of the first 
American furnaces to use coal for fuel. Peter Temin, Iron and Steel in 
Nineteenth Century Americn (Cambridge Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1964) p. 48; 
Edward C. Hungerford, The Story of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad 
(New York: G. P. Putnam, 1928), I, 72. 
I5 Dictionary of American Biography (New York: Scribner, 
1928-37) VIII, 112-l 13. Ketcham was an invaluable partner. Not only did 
his capital spare the firm the financial vicissitudes that beset its chief 
competitors Baldwin and Norris, but in addition Ketcham became a di- 
rector of the Illinois Central Railroad in the 1850’s, and channeled that 
road’s locomotive orders to Rogers. See John H. White, Jr., American 
Locomotives: An Engineering History (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 
1968& p. 24. 
Semi-Centennial Memoir of the Harlan and Hollingsworth Company 
(Wilmington: Harlan and Hollingsworth, 1886), pp. 125-139, 174-175; 
Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad, Annual Reports, 
1840-1866; Wilmington City Directory, 1845, p. 81. Delaware Gazette, 
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Norris and Baldwin belong to the category of firms rescued by the 
timely infusion of outside capital. William Norris began business in 1832 as 
the American Steam Carriage Company. By 1842 he was bankrupt and had 
to be rescued by his brother Richard, who came armed with a fortune 
made in the family dry goods business.17 Matthias Baldwin, a jewler and 
instrument maker turned machinery builder, constructed his first loco- 
motive in 1832. He avoided bankruptcy in 1837 because mercantile 
creditors such as Anson Phelps of New York, and Hendricks and Brother 
of Philadelphia extended his notes for as much as six years. He also 
secured capital from a succession of partners including the New Jersey 
industrialist and capitalist Stephen Vail (1839), and Asa Whitney of Phila- 
delphia (1842). l8 
Perhaps the most dramatically successful example of this form of 
industrial finance was Jones and Laughlin of Pittsburgh. I9 The firm began 
in 1853 as a partnership between Benjamin Lauth, Francis Lautb, 
Benjamin Jones and Samuel Kier. The Lauths were immigrant German 
December 9, 1834; Jack C. Potter, “The PhiIadelphia, Wilmington, and 
Baltimore Railroad, 183 l-l 840” (unpublished master’s thesis, University 
of Delaware, 1960), pp. 73-l 7 1. 
“DAB, VII, 555-556. 
l8 DAB, I, 541-542. Malcolm C. Clark, “The Birth of an Enterprise: 
Baldwin Locomotive, 1831-1842,” Pennsylvania Magazine of History and 
Biography, 90 (1966), 423-444, details Baldwin’s financial struggles in his 
early years. Judge Stephen Vail was the owner of the Speedwell Iron 
Works in Morristown, New Jersey, the firm that supplied Baldwin with 
cranks and axles for his locomotives. The Judge took no active part in the 
locomotive works; he turned his interest over to his sons George and 
Alfred. Alfred Vail is better known to history as the operator who received 
Samuel Morse’s first message, “What hath God wrought!” in Baltimore on 
May 24, 1844. He had become Morse’s partner in 1837, and designed most 
of the telegraphic apparatus used in the first transmission. Alfred ap- 
parently was a man of acute perceptions, but little faith. He spotted the 
potential of both Morse and Baldwin, but dropped out of both partner- 
ships too soon, and died broke. See DAB, X, 136-137. 
Asa Whitney had been Superintendent of the Mohawk and Hudson 
Railroad, and a New York State Canal Commissioner before joining Bald- 
win’s firm. He was a member of an old Massachusetts mercantile family, 
and a careful businessman who brought order into Baldwin’s chaotic busi- 
ness methods. (DAB, X, 156-157.) He left Baldwin in 1846 and opened a 
car wheel foundry which became Lobdell’s chief competitor. He became 
president of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad in 1860. 
l9 Jones and Laughlin is particularly interesting to study because it is 
unique among “Big Steel” firms in having grown entirely through internal 
expansion. It absorbed no other producing firms until 1943. 
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metalworkers who had built a rolling mill on the south side of the 
Monongahela River in 1850. Although the Lauths were mechanically in- 
genious (they perfected a cold-rolling process that produced a very hard 
iron with a smooth, shiny exterior surface),” they quickly encountered 
the financial difficulties that were the bane of all western Pennsylvania 
ironmasters’ existence before the Civil War.” By 1853 they were floun- 
dering, and sought added capital in the Pittsburgh mercantile community. 
This search eventuated in the alliance with Jones and Kier, who con- 
tributed $10,000 cash to the business, paid the Lauths $2700 for their 
previous efforts, and became equal partners in the business. ‘* 
Jones and Kier were specialized freight commission brokers who had 
operated the “Mechanics’ Line of Packets” between Philadelphia and Pitts- 
burgh over the Main Line Canal and Portage Railroad. When the Pennsyl- 
vania Railroad reached Pittsburgh in 1852, they shrewdly perceived that 
the heyday of the freight commission broker had passed; therefore, they 
sold out, opened an iron commission business, and became partners with 
the Lauths. 23 
*‘Thomas E. Lloyd, “History of Jones and Laughlin Steel Corpora- 
tion,” mineographed copy dated 1938, in Old History Papers, Jones and 
Laughlin Corporation, Gateway Center, Pittsburgh, Pa. (Hereafter cited 
J and L MSS.) I want to thank Mr. Edward Ford, Secretary of Jones and 
Laughlin, and his staff for their courtesy and cooperation. 
21 Capital shortages in Pittsburgy are elaborated in Louis C. Hunter, 
“Financial Problems of the Early Pittsburgh Iron Manufacturers,” Journal 
of Economic and Business History, 2 (1930), 520-544; Willis L. King, 
“Speech Delivered Before the Aliquippa Engineers Institute on the History 
of Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation,” November 19, 1930, mimeo- 
graphed copy in J and L MSS. King was Benjamin Jones’ nephew. 
22Agreement between Benjamin Lauth and Francis Lauth with S. M. 
Kier and B. F. Jones, December 3, 1853. J and L MSS, 
23 Kier was never an active partner in the rolling mill In 1856 he 
committed a spectacular error of judgement by trading his one-quarter 
interest in the firm to Jones in exchange for Jones’ share of their commis- 
sion business. Kier was a fabulous, multi-faceted character. In addition to 
the freight, iron, and commission businesses, he also owned fire-brick and 
pottery factories. In a more exotic vein, he drew off the crude oil that 
seeped into his father’s salt wells near Tarentum Pa., and bottled it as a 
panecea called “Kier’s Rock Oil.” He developed a following for this 
wondrous concoction by sending a “medicine road show” around the 
country in the 1840’s. When a steady demand arose, he sold through 
regular drug channels. In the 1850’s he developed 2 method of distilling 
crude oil for use as an illuminant, as well as a patent lamp in which to bum 
it. See Release: Benjamin F. Jones from All Liability to Co-partners in 
Firms of Grover, Kier and Co., and Kier, Jones and Co., and Samuel M. 
Kier from All Liability to Co-partners in Jones, Lauth and Co., Janu- 
ary 17, 1856, J and L MSS; DAB V, 371-372. 
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Under the terms of the partnership Jones and both Lauths each re- 
ceived $1500 salaries. The partners agreed to draw no other funds from 
the business; all profits were to be added to the capital. The Lauths ran the 
rolling mill; Jones had charge of “warehouses, books, accounts and 
finances.“24 Jones soon proved a singularly nimble financial manager, and 
he saved the business, for despite the fresh injection of cash and the 
agreement to plow profits back into the business, the new firm almost 
immediately needed additional long-term and working capital. Jones was 
able to arrange for both; moreover, he did so on extremely favorable 
terms in a region where dozens of manufacturers competed for the limited 
quantity of capital available. The “angel” was a Pittsburgh commission 
merchant, James Laughlin. 
Laughlin was an Irish immigrant who had made his fortune as a pork 
packer and seller of provisions to settlers passing through Pittsburgh on 
their way west. In the 1850’s he operated commission houses dealing in 
iron and groceries in Pittsburgh and Evansville, Indiana. Laughlin sold iron 
from the Jones and Lauth works, and apparently had great faith in the 
future of the firm, for he soon became its financial backer. By March, 
1855, he had already contributed $8200 cash to the firm’s capital. In that 
year he contributed $40,000 additional and became a partner in the busi- 
ness. 25 As a partner Laughlin was a manufacturing entrepreneur’s dream. 
He took no part in the active management of the business,26 but backed 
the firm with his entire financial resources through the crucial first decade 
of its existence. He contributed his personal wealth to the firm’s long-term 
capital, and used his personal credit standing to arrange for adequate work- 
ing capital. 
Whether J and L could have survived without Laughlin’s all-out sup- 
port is debatable. It was the only preCivi1 War iron firm, other than 
integrated rail mills, that survived to become one of “Big Steel,” and 
one of the few unintegrated, ante-bellum iron firms that succeeded in 
shifting to the integrated, high-volume structure. Compared to single-stage 
furnaces or mills, the integrated mill required large sums of capital. The 
24 Articles of Partnership between Benjamin Lauth and Francis Lauth 
with S. M. Kier and B. F. Jones, December 3, 1853, J. and L MSS. 
25 Agreement between James Laughlin and Jones, Lauth Co., March 8, 
1855; Limited Partnership: Benjamin F. Jones, Bernard Lauth, and James 
Laughlin (James Laughhn Special Partner), Term Five Years from 
August 1, 1856, J and L MSS. Francis Lauth had already dropped out of 
the business. His brother sold out in 1864 for $10,000, went back to 
Germany, and made a fortune in iron and steel there. 
26 His sons did, however; two of them became partners in 186 1. 
Others joined in 1870. With one or two exceptions a member of the Jones 
or Laughlin families has headed the firm since its inception. 
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rail mills obtained theirs from the pooled resources of several merchants. 27 
In the 1850’s, Jones and Laughlin transformed the Lauth’s small, single- 
stage bar mill into a large, integrated unit. By 1857 the firm had its own 
blast furnaces to furnish pig iron, thirty-one puddling and heating furnaces 
to refine the iron and prepare it for rolling, five trains of steam driven rolls 
to produce bar iron and shafting, and twenty-five nailmaking machines. 28 
As a result of expansion and integration, capital invested rose from 
$20,000 in 1853 to $176,000 in 1861. The increase came entirely from 
profits and James Laughlin’s cash contributions. Retained earnings alone 
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SOURCE: Computed from data in various articles of partnership cited above, as well 
as the partnership agreement of 1861, and a table of earnings and 
dividends submitted as an interdepartmental memo from l-l. S. Geneen, 
Comptroller of Jones and Laughlin, to W. R. Compton, Assistant 
Chairman of the Board, dated Dec. 2,1952. All items are in the J and L 
MSS. 
After 1861 the firm continued its policy of financing expansion 
through retained earnings. From 1854 to 1908 the firm’s profit totelled 
$70.000.000. Eighty per cent of it was plowed back into the business. 
Great as Laughlin’s contributions to the firm’s long-term capital were, 
they were probably less important to its ultimate success than his ability 
to secure adequate working capital. He was able to do so because his 
27 For a discussion of relative capital costs of integrated and unin- 
tegrated iron works, see Temin, Iron and Steel; the founding and develop- 
ment of the ante-bellum integrated rail mills is described in Harold C. 
Livesay, “The Production and Distribution of Iron in Ante-Bellum Amer- 
ica,” forthcoming in Business History Review. 
28 Lloyd, “History of Jones and Laughlin”; J. P. Lesley, Iron Manu- 
facturer’s Guide (New York: John Wiley, 1859), pp. 247-248. The mill’s 
capacity rose from fifteen tons per day in 1853 to one hundred tons in 
1869, King, 
J and L MSS. 
“Speech . before the Aliquippa Engineers.. . ,” 
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endorsements enabled J & L to discount its own and its customers’ short- 
term notes for cash to meet operating expenses. Working capital was not 
only far more difficult for most manufacturers to come by; the annual 
requirements for it greatly exceeded the average annual additions to fixed 
assets. In 1860, for example, when J and L’s fixed assets totalled about 
$176,000, it had short-term obligations of $200,000 to the Pittsburgh 
Trust co.29 
The firm was able to secure such extensive credit only because its 
paper carried the endorsement of Laughlin, a merchant and a stockholder 
in several Pittsburgh banks. 30 Jones had previously been unable to obtain 
such advances on the strength of his own (or his firm’s) credit alone. 
Virtually ah antebellum manufacturers had similar requirements for short- 
term capital relative to total investments; very few had a James Laughlin 
to obtain it for them. The ability to secure such funds often determined 
success or failure; the way in which they were obtained often determined 
the conduct of the business. 
FYoblems of Working &pita1 
Working capital presented particularly perplexing problems to early 
manufacturers both because of the large quantity required, and the 
paucity of agencies, formal or informal, prepared to supply it. The quan- 
tity required was primarily a result of high operating costs, and the credit, 
banking, and monetary systems prevailing in the United States prior to the 
Civil War. 
The Jones and Laughlin case cited above, in which short-term obliga- 
tions roughly equaled the fixed assets accumulated through the entire life 
of the business, was not at all unusual in precivil War American manu- 
facturing firms. For example, E. I. du Pont de Nemours, the Wilmington, 
Delaware powder firm founded in 1802, had capital assets of $500,000 in 
1860. Its current operating expenses the same year were $440,000. In 
smaller firms the ratio of current expenses to capital assets was often much 
“Acknowledgement of Obligation of James Laughlin and Ben- 
jamin F. Jones to the Pittsburgh Trust Company to the Extent of 
$200,000, March 16, 1860, J and L MSS. Laughlin was president of Pitts- 
burgh Trust when he first became interested in the rolling mill. 
30 In order to get the Bank of Pittsburgh to discount the firm’s notes 
and bills, Laughlin (in his role as endorser) submitted a statement of his 
personal wealth. In addition to a 13/32 interest in the iron works, he had 
$50,000 in real estate, $75,000 cash capital in his commission houses, and 
$25,000 in bank stock. James Laughlin to President and Cashier, Bank of 
Pittsburgh, August 26, 1857, J and L MSS. 
higher. John Roebling’s wire rope factory at Trenton, New Jersey had in 
1850 fixed assets of $20,000; labor and material costs totalled $42,000.3’ 
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SOURCE-: Computed from data in White, American Locomotives, p.20; Memoir 
of. Harlan and Hollignsworth, pp. 535-538; Baldwin Ledgers, Baldwin 
Locomotive Works Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 
Philadelphia, Pa. f Hereafter cited Baldwin MSS); Census of 
Manufacturers, 1860, pp. clxxxviii, clxxxix, 333, 343. Harlan and 
Hollingsworth figures are for car shops only and do not include the 
shipbuilding division. 
Wages and raw material costs constituted the bulk of current operat- 
ing expenses. Both of these were “variable costs,” rising and falling with 
the level of production. When an entrepreneur decided to expand produc- 
tion, he almost immediately encountered increased payroll expenses. Raw 
material costs also rose, but these could often be deferred to some extent 
by purchasing on credit. Suppliers, however, had payrolls of their own to 
meet, and persistently pressed for punctual payment. Transportation costs 
(another variable) also had to be paid in cash or on short-term (usually 
thirty days or less) credit. All of these factors combined to present manu- 
facturing extrepreneurs with a criticai shortage of operating capital to 
meet the expenses of production. 
Income, on the other hand, came from sales almost invariably made 
on long-term credit. 32 The average term of credit in most manufacturing 
31 Census of Manufactures, 1860, pp. 53, 55, et passim; D. B. Stein- 
man, Builders of the Bridge: The Story of John Roebling and His Son 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1945), p. 147. 
32 Cash payment was extremely rare, despite the considerable savings 
offered through avoidance of discount costs. Manufacturers and merchants 
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lines was six months, but this often fluctuated. In competitive markets, 
manufacturers often had to offer more generous terms. The prevalence of 
long credit terms was not so much a function of the money supply as of 
the predominantly agricultural nature of the economy. The best available 
estimates indicate that manufacturing contributed about one-quarter of 
the total value added in all American industries in 1839. By 1850, manu- 
facturing’s share had risen to about one-third.33 In such an economy, 
manufacturing credit terms were necessarily tied to agricultural credit 
terms. The latter, of course, were a function of the harvest cycle. In either 
case there was considerable delay before suppliers received payment in 
full. 34 
Customers paid for their purchases by sending a note-in effect a 
postdated check payable at the expiration of the credit period. The manu- 
facturer needed immediate cash to meet expenses. If the note came from a 
local resident of good credit standing, it could sometimes be cashed at a 
local bank for a fee (discount) which varied according to the prevailing 
demand for money. The discount of course reduced the profit on sales 
and added to the cost of doing business.35 To avoid this cost, manufac- 
turers sometimes accepted payment in produce which they foisted off on 
employees as partial payment of wages. 36 
These methods broke down as production increased and markets ex- 
panded geographically. Banks refused to accept most out-of-town notes, or 
usually offered price reductions up to ten per cent for payment in cash. 
Despite these inducements, the only ante-bellum firm among those whose 
papers I have seen that habitually paid in cash, in good times and bad, was 
the Conshohocken, Pa. rolling mill operated by James and John Wood. 
Not only did the Woods pay cash for supplies; they invariably held their 
customers’ notes to maturity, a remarkable feat at the time. See the cor- 
respondence and account books in Alan Wood Steel MSS, Eleutherian 
Mills Historical Library, Greenville, Del. 
33 U. S. Census Bureau, Historical Statistics of the United States from 
Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960), 
p. 139. 
34 Redlich, Banking, I, 48. 
35 Just how much discount and interest costs amounted to is ex- 
tremely difficult to estimate. We believe that such costs absorbed, on the 
average, 10% of the gross revenue in the period 1830-1860. It may well 
have been a great deal higher. Presumably the most successful entrepre- 
neurs anticipated fluctuations in the money market in setting prices. 
36A questionable practice later outlawed by some states, and institu- 
tionalized in “company stores” in others. Payment in produce continued 
with small firms throughout the period; however, it had pretty well disap- 
peared by 1840 in the firms with which I am concerned here. 
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would accept them only at prohibitive discount.37 Even if the manu- 
facturer could afford to hold the note until payment date, and even if it 
did not prove worthless, his troubles were not over, for checks drawn on 
distant banks, or notes issued by them, also were subject to discount. 
Manufacturers therefore tried to insist on payment in local funds, or in 
paper that traded at face value 10cally.~~ All the while of course their 
suppliers were making similar demands on them. Factory owners generally 
were ill-equipped to deal with these perplexities; they had neither the time 
nor the experience. What they needed were financial intermediaries 
capable of supplying reliable credit information, rationalizing payments so 
as to minimize discount costs, and furnishing operating cash either by 
discounting notes, making advances on accounts receivable, or lending on 
inventories. 
In the modern economy a complex network of formal, institutions 
performs all these functions. National and local credit agencies abound. 
Banks discount reliable manufacturers’ notes, and lend on receivables. Two 
types of companies specialize in industrial finance: commercial credit com- 
panies discount notes and lend on receivables; factoring companies buy 
accounts receivable outright and lend on inventories3’ Before the Civil 
War no such salubrious conditions obtained. Credit rating agencies existed, 
but primarily served mercantile clients. Banks grew progressively more 
reluctant to discount notes bearing a manufacturer’s endorsement; they 
rarely (if ever) lent on receivables. Commercial credit and factoring com- 
panies are a twentieth century development; the first of each type 
probably appeared in 1903 and 1925 respectively.40 
The late development of formal fiduciary institutions geared to manu- 
facturers’ needs, and the enduring reluctance of banks to provide working 
capital and finance transactions, were, like the prevalence of long-term 
37 This was particularly true after the demise of the Second Bank of 
the United States rendered transfer of funds difficult and diminished the 
reliability of state bank notes. 
aa See George Rogers Taylor, Transportation Revolution (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1968), pp. 312-323 and Chapter 15 for a lucid descrip- 
tion of monetary and banking practices, their hazards, and abuses. 
3g Terris Moore, “Unsecured Bank Loans as Permanent Working 
Capital for Industry” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 
1936), pp. 116-l 17; William T. Rhame, “Competitive Advantages and Dis- 
advantages of Agencies Making Short and Medium Term Loans to In- 
dustry” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1940), 
pp. 5-42. 
4o Moore, “Bank Loans as Working Capital,” pp. 116-l 17; Joseph E. 
Hedges, Commercial Banking and the Stock Market Before 1863 (Balti- 
more: Johns Hopkins Press, 1938), p. 86. 
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credit, largely attributable to the pre-eminence of the agricultural sector of 
the economy. Not until the 1880’s did the total annual value of manu- 
facturing production exceed the total value of agricultural output.41 
Credit institutions (particularly commercial banks) were, therefore, 
oriented to financing the movement of crops to market at home and 
abroad. They tended to remain so for two reasons. 
The first reason was a philosophical conservatism that deeply in- 
fluenced banking policies. Early nineteenth century banks were not in 
business to take “risks” in the sense that we understand the term today. 
Savings banks were in business to accept deposits, pool them, and use the 
resulting fund of capital to invest in mortgages, or government bonds. The 
value of the property, or the credit of the U.S. government eliminated the 
element of risk. 
Most commercial banks had been founded by merchants to service the 
needs of the agricultural and commercial economy. They facilitated com- 
merce at home and abroad by discounting notes and serving as clearing 
houses for bills of exchange. These transactions were not considered 
hazardous because the value of the goods for which notes and bills were 
issued, together with the personal assets of the merchants involved in the 
transaction, protected the bank against losses. Because banks were not 
accustomed to extending these services to manufacturers, and because 
most early producers were men of limited means, bankers tended to regard 
manufacturing finance as unknown and risky. It was, therefore, beyond 
the scope of sound banking practice. It took decades of manufacturing 
growth to alter this conservative philosophy. 
The second reason for the delayed entry of formal institutions into 
manufacturing finance was the fact that early manufacturers, finding no 
formal agencies willing or able to assume the financial risks of expanding 
production and markets, turned to merchants for help. Merchants supplied 
the needed capital and expertise, and in the process became deeply en- 
trenched in the manufacturing sector. 
Merchants as Financial Agents and 
Suppliers of Short- Term Capital 
Merchants became involved in the day-to-day financial and business 
affairs of manufacturers as a logical outgrowth of their role as distributors 
of manufactured products. Few manufacturers had the time or talents to 
market their goods in outlying areas. Instead, they turned distribution over 
to specialized urban merchants whose knowledge of markets and trading 
41 U.S. Census, Historical Statistics, pp. 139-140. 
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practises enabled them to manage the growing flow of goods throughout 
the economy. 
In so doing they brought their experience and skill to bear on the 
assortment of capital, credit, banking, and monetary woes that beset 
ambitious manufacturers. Problems which defied solution by manufactur- 
ing entrepreneurs were routinely resolved by merchants using traditional 
techniques. Traders since the middle ages had had to assemble capital, 
evaluate investment risks, maintain a flow of credit information, function 
as investment and commercial bankers, and master the art of doing busi- 
ness over long distances with a polyglot assortment of currencies and 
commercial paper. In short, merchants routinely performed all the func- 
tions later institutionalized in formal agencies such as banks, credit 
bureaus and factoring companies. Their financial versatility, developed 
through the centuries in the pre-industrial economy, proved readily 
adaptable to manufacturing. Entrepreneurs who sought outlying markets 
were pioneers in American manufacturing; however, the commission mer- 
chants and jobbers who distributed their products functioned as they and 
their predecessors always had in arranging and financing transactions. 
In the process they naturally kept current on the credit standing of 
clients, and further relieved manufacturers of credit risks by guaranteeing 
payment on all sales they arranged-usually charging 2 l/2% commission 
for the service. They also brought some order to the chaos of notes and 
currency. Through widespread connections in the trading and banking 
community, they were able to absorb and dispose of commercial paper 
with much less loss than manufacturers. For example, Bonney and Bush, 
who had many customers in the South, sold southern notes and drafts to a 
Philadelphia cotton broker, C.H. Abbott. Abbott in turn sent the notes 
South to pay for his cotton purchases. On at least one occasion, Bush, on 
Abbott’s advice, instructed his New Orleans agent to purchase cotton with 
funds due them from Louisiana and Alabama. The cotton was shipped to 
Philadelphia and sold by Abbott, who then paid Bush with notes redeem- 
able in PhiIadelphia.42 
Commission merchants customarily rendered payment in their own 
42 Abbott to Bonney and Bush, March 7, 1838 ; Seamans and Shackle- 
ford to Bonney and Bush, April 13, 1838, Lobdell Car Wheel Co. MSS, 
Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. (Hereafter cited Lobdell 
MSS.) 
Similar problems beset Baldwin. After 1837 he demanded payment in 
Philadelphia funds, or in paper that traded at pa; in the East. He often 
refused to make delivery until such payment was guaranteed. See Letter- 
books, Baldwin MSS; Clark, “Baldwin Locomotive,” pp. 431-432, 
436-437. 
The Financial Role of Merchants 81 
notes. In the case of such prosperous individuals as Enoch Pratt of Balti- 
more, or Robert Cabeen of Philadelphia, these notes discounted so readily 
in most northeastern cities that they circulated much like banknotes, 
adding appreciably to the money supply, accelerating the cash flow, and 
easing the pressure for working capital. Merchants also supplied short-term 
funds in other ways. Some, like Laughlin, endorsed notes so that banks 
would accept them. Unlike Laughlin, most middlemen were not partners 
in the business and, therefore, charged a fee for the service. 
Other merchants acted as note brokers, using their own funds to 
discount manufacturers’ paper. The risks in such dealings were high, but so 
were the returns. Merchants’ discount rates were often not subject to 
usury laws, or the laws were evaded. In a period when six per cent or less 
was the normal bank interest rate to preferred borrowers, note brokers 
often charged as high as thirty per cent, and rarely less than twelve per 
cent.43 In such circumstances it is not surprising to find that many mer- 
chants borrowed heavily from banks to underwrite their discounting 
activities.44 For example, the Baltimore iron brokers John Gittings and 
E. J. Stickney borrowed hundreds of thousands of dollars from the Sav- 
ings Bank of Baltimore in the period 1845 to 1866. During that time they 
made loans and discounted notes for several manufacturers including 
Lobdell Car Wheel, and the Locust Point Furnace (Maryland).45 Some 
measure of the profitability of such operations when prudently managed 
can be seen in the career of the Philadelphia metal dealer Nathan Trotter. 
Trotter habitually put his surplus funds into discounting. Between 1833 
and 1852 he cleared almost half a million dollars from such deals.46 
With such widespread demand for discounting, and such great profits 
43 Don M. Dailey, “The Early Development of the Note Brokerage 
Business in Chicago,” Journal of Political Economy, 46 (1938), 202-2 17; 
Davis, “New England Textile Mills,” p. 7; Elva Tooker, “A Merchant Turns 
to Money-Lending in Philadelphia,” Business History Society Bulletin, 20 
(1942, 71-85; Klein, “Mercantile Instruments of Credit,” p. 603. 
See William B. Catton, “John W. Garrett of the Baltimore and 
Ohio” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1959), 
pp. 48-49, 9 l-93. 
45 Payne and Davis, Savings Bank of Baltimore; credit report of 
Locust Point Furnace, in Baltimore, Md., vol. 8, p. 348, D and B. MSS. On 
occasion Baltimore banks were reportedly unable to discount any kind of 
paper because the entire supply of loanable funds was in the hands of 
merchants and note brokers. See Klein, “Mercantile Instruments of 
Credit,” p. 603. 
46 Elva Tooker, Nathan Trotter (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1955), p. 182. Not all of the paper Trotter handled was manu- 
facturers’; he also dealt in bills of exchange. 
82 Explorations in Ecorzomic Historq 
to be made, many merchants quit dealing in merchandise altogether and 
became specialized note brokers. Their services were expensive, but since 
they were available nowhere else, note brokers proved indispensable to 
many manufacturers. As the volume of trade increased, so did specializa- 
tion. Note brokerage as a speculation by commission merchants with sur- 
plus funds was commonplace by 1830. Specialized note brokers appeared 
by 1840. By 1850, some of them were further specialized, handling only 
one kind of paper, e.g., iron or dry goods.47 Thus volume brought disin- 
tegration of the merchants’ cluster of financial competencies, just as it had 
already transformed the manifold mercantile functions of the all-purpose 
merchant into specialized fields such as dry goods jobbing. In time the 
process of disintegration produced specialists in every sphere of financial 
responsibility, and these became the precursors of the formal institutions 
that appeared after the Civil War. 
Commission merchants also supplied working capital by making ad- 
vances on sales. Brokers paid producers some portion of the total value of 
the goods as soon as they had been shipped. For example, in 1819 Ballard 
and Hall, Baltimore commission merchants, wrote Jacob Haldeman, a New 
Cumberland, Pa. rolling mill proprietor, after receipt of a shipment of iron, 
“You are at liberty to value on us payable in 90 days and your draft will 
meet due honor.” The commission house declared itself “always willing to 
make advances to any desired extent on goods in hand . if you continue 
your shipments or iron.“48 
This practice was universal before the Civil War, and was often 
formalized by a contract between a manufacturing firm and a commission 
47 Klein, “Mercantile Instruments of Credit,” pp. 533-535. 
48 Ballard and Hall to Haldeman, May 18, 1819 and February 24, 
1820. See also Andrew Hall to Haldeman, December 31, 1819 and David 
Kizer to Haldeman, March 24, 1820, Haldeman MSS, Eleutherian Mills 
Historical Library, Greenville, Del. Frequently such advances were subject 
to interest charges. 
When the merchant authorized the manufacturer to “draw” on him, 
the manufacturer filled out a promissory note showing amount, and date 
of maturity. He sent this to the merchant who signed (“accepted”) and 
returned it. The manufacturer could then hold the note to maturity or 
discount it for cash. The policy of drawing advances on unsold goods was 
not restricted to proprietorships like Haldeman’s. Equity financed firms 
used it as well. Advances from textile selling houses were a vital source of 
working capital for the mills, and Whitaker Iron sometimes kept its 
wheeling mill running on advances from Enoch Pratt. Davis, “New England 
Textile Mills,” pp. 6-7; Nelson Whitaker to George P. Whitaker, Novem- 
ber 17, 1868, Whitaker Iron Papers, Maryland Historical Society. Hereafter 
cited “Whitaker Iron MSS.” 
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house. 4g Typical of such agreements was one between Robeson, Brooke 
Company, blast furnace operators of Berks County, Pennsylvania and the 
Philadelphia iron brokerage house Whitaker and Coudon. The brokers 
bound themselves to 
. undertake the sale of your iron for two years. . charging you 
5% commission and guarantee on the entire product of said furnace 
[plus] the usual charges for weighing, wharfage &c., and will advance 
you either in cash or our paper-monthly, the amount of sales, fast as 
made less charges and interest. 
Whitaker and Coudon thus assumed the role of exclusive manufacturer’s 
agent for Robeson, Brook. In return for exclusive sales rights, the brokers 
promised to supply working capital. 
We will agree to loan you our paper to the amount of Thirty thousand 
dollars for which we will charge you two & one half per cent. 
Several important stipulations were involved. First, the furnace had to 
supply five thousand tons of pig iron annually. If it failed to do so, the 
interest on the loan jumped to five per cent. Second, the brokers reserved 
the right to discount their own paper (thereby adding brokerage fees to 
the interest charges), and the furnace could cash it elsewhere only with 
permission. Third, if the loan was not repaid within a year, “We will charge 
you over and above the commission the street rate or charge for the 
money.“” 
Whitaker and Coudon’s loan was in effect an advance against future 
production. Such advances were another classic mercantile technique 
developed in the pre-industrial economy in the form of advances against 
crops, and practised throughout the nineteenth century by cotton and 
grain factors.” Sometimes such gambles paid off handsomely. Gibbons 
4g Klein, “Mercantile Instruments of Credit,” pp. 526-528. 
So Whitaker and Coudon to Robeson, Brooke Company, March 8, 
1858<rWhitaker Iron MSS. 
This mercantile technique was traditionally employed not only in 
agriculture, but was used for centuries in other industries as well. In the 
seventeenth century British woolen merchants made advances to weavers 
and London coal merchants financed the operations of mining entre- 
preneurs in order to assure future supplies. See William Hitlyer, “Four 
Centuries of Factoring,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 53 (1939), 
305-3 11, and John U. Nef, “Dominance of the Trader in the English Coal 
Industry in the Seventeenth Century,” Journal of Economic and Business 
History, 1 (1928-1929), 422-433. As often subsequently happened in nine- 
teenth century U.S. manufacturing, the coal merchants’ advances of short- 
term capital often led to ownership of the producing property. 
and Huston, a Coatesville, Pennsylvania rolling mill that specialized in 
boiler plate, weathered the slump of 1857 with the help of advances from 
Curtis Bouve, a Boston commission house, and went on to renewed 
prosperity, eventually becoming Lukens Steel. Samuel Colt’s suppliers 
(principally Naylor and Co., a New York commission house) financed him 
until his first government contract in the 1840’s assured the success of his 
revolver. Commission agents also made large advances to railway equip- 
ment producers. Throughout the 1850’s, for example, Morris Jesup of 
New York helped Lobdell, Rogers, Baldwin, and Harlan and Hollingsworth 
in this way. 52 All of these firms prospered with Jesup’s help, and he 
benefited doubly through interest on his advances, and by securing to 
himself preferential treatment from the major producers in his special 
line. s3 
In addition to making advances and discounting notes, Jesup and his 
colleagues performed other valuable financial functions for both the rail- 
road equipment manufacturers and their customers. Before the Panic of 
1837, many new railroads were well financed, and were able to pay cash 
for their equipment. During and after the recession, funds were tighter, 
and railroads often sought long credit terms. Commission merchants, with 
their greater resources of cash and credit, were better able than manu- 
facturers to offer the necessary credit extensions. 
In addition, railroads often sought to make partial payment with their 
stock and bonds. For understandable reasons, producers were extremely 
reluctant to accept securities. For one thing many of them had sustained 
losses in the early years of railroad construction. Harlan and Hollingsworth 
accepted stock in the Annapolis and Elk Ridge Railroad in partial payment 
for some cars delivered in 1838. The railroad soon collapsed, and the car 
builders received only “some curious and antiquated specimens of the 
wagoner’s art” in payment. 54 Bad news like this traveled fast among rail- 
road suppliers, most of whom knew each other personally and cor- 
responded regularly. 
52 Curtis Bouve to Charles Huston, October 8, 1857, December 11, 
1857, and January 15, 1858, Lukens Steel MSS, Eieutherian Mills 
Historical Library; Correspondence, 1847-1850, Samuel Colt MSS, Con- 
necticut Historical Society, Hartford, Conn.;Correspondence, 1850-1861, 
and Bush and Lobdell in Account with M. K. Jesup, 18,59-1860, Lobdell 
MSS; Baldwin Ledgers and Letterbooks, 1857-1861, Baldwin MSS. 
53 On some occasions, of course, such gambles proved ill-chosen. The 
Columbia, S. C. commission house Polock, Solomon, and Co. lost $9,000 
in advances when an iron furnace went bankrupt. See Ernest M. Lander, 
Jr., “The Iron Industry in Ante-Bellum South Carolina,” Journal of 
Southern History, 20 (1954), 337-355. 
SQ Memoir of Harlan and Hollingsworth, p. 176. 
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The principal objection manufacturers had to accepting stock or 
bonds in payment was, of course, the fact that they were not cash, and 
could be converted only at a discount. Altogether, such securities repre- 
sented a heavy risk, and manufacturers resisted the pressure to accept 
them as much as possible. When forced to take them, as all manufacturers 
eventually were, they tried to minimize the risk by insisting on overpay- 
ment, e.g., $1 SO worth of stock or bonds for each $1.00 in material 
delivered. 
Commission merchants were better equipped to accept large quan- 
tities of railroad securities. They had superior knowledge of the roads’ 
finances because of their access to a constant flow of credit information. 
They were, therefore, better able to judge which securities were sound and 
which were not. They were also often willing to invest their surplus 
capital in railroad shares and did so by taking securities in payment for 
material, using their cash or credit to pay suppliers. Through this process 
many commission merchants became important railroad stockholders. 
Jesup, for example, was a major stock and bond owner in the Chicago and 
Alton, Toledo, Peoria, and Western, and a number of others. Both his 
partners, John Crerar and J.S. Kennedy, also became important railroad 
capitalists.” 
Middlemen also engaged in barter transactions with manufacturers, 
thereby reducing the need for cash operating capital. John Wood, the 
Conshohocken, Pennsylvania rolling mill operator, shipped sheet iron to 
” William A. Brown, Morris Ketchum Jesup, u Character Sketch (New 
York: Scribners, 1910), pp. 34-37; all three of the partners had remarkable 
careers. After the Civil War they quit dealing in merchandise and became 
investment bankers specializing in railroad securities. Jesup was instru- 
mental in establishing the American Museum of Natural History, and 
helped finance Peary’s expedition to the North Pole. 
Congress appointed J.S. Kennedy one of the incorporators of the 
Union Pacific. He was also a director of the Chicago, Burlington, and 
Quincy; Pittsburgh, Ft. Wayne, and Chicago; New York, Chicago and 
St. Louis and other railroads. He was a member of the syndicate that built 
the Canadian Pacific, was James J. Hill’s closest associate, and participated 
in the formation of Northern Securities. 
John Crerar was one of George Pullman’s principal backers. He was an 
incorporator and director of the Pullman Company, and a director of the 
Illinois Trust and Savings Bank. Along with a talent for making money, he 
shared with Morris Jesup an enthusiasm for Comstockery. Jesup backed 
Anthony Comstock himself, and Crerar’s bequest to the library he 
founded banned “all nastiness and immorality [including] dirty French 
novels and all skeptical trash and works of questionable moral tone.” In 
the face of this sweeping edict, the trustees took the only sensible way out 
and restricted the Crerar Library’s collections to technical and scientific 
works. DAB, 11, 537-538, v. 61-62, 334-335. 
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Anson Phelps in return for copper and brass. Fall River Iron regularly paid 
Enoch Pratt and E.J. Stickney for pig iron by shipping them nails. 56 Such 
transactions were often advantageous for both parties, for the manu- 
facturer disposed of his products and secured raw materials without adding 
to his debts or undergoing discount costs. Brokers of course profited on 
the sale of both raw materials and finished products. 
Through the application of their financial expertise concomitant with 
their role as distributors and suppliers, merchants made it possible for 
American manufacturers to function in expanding markets. Their control 
of finances often allowed them to dictate policy to manufacturers. Some 
merchants became partners in or owners of producing firms as a result of 
their advances. In this way Joseph Anderson became president of Tredegar 
Iron in Richmond, Virginia; Morris Jesup became vice-president of Rogers 
Locomotive; New York commission merchant Augustus Moen joined the 
wire-making firm of Washburn and Godard. Similar examples abound in 
the histories of ante-bellum manufacturing firms. 
Summary 
Thus most early American manufacturing firms existed as a partner- 
ship (formal or informal) between technically knowledgeable factory 
owners or managers on the one hand, and mercantile capitalists on the 
other. Sometimes (as in the rail and textile mills) these alliances developed 
when merchants, perceiving a new market and seeking a profitable outlet 
for unused resources, pooled their funds to construct a factory, engage a 
supervisory staff, and commence production. On other occasions estab- 
lished manufacturers took in merchant partners in order to secure capital. 
Thus Jones and Laughlin. Jobbers and commission merchants became in- 
volved as a logical consequence of their role as distributors and suppliers. 
Whatever the particular circumstances, the ultimate effect of these 
relationships was to open a channel through which capital poured from the 
mercantile sector into the manufacturing sector of the economy. 
Merchants were the agents of transfer, a role which resulted naturally 
from their position at the nexus of American commerce. When American 
markets for manufactures grew in the early nineteenth century, their ex- 
pansion presented both an incentive and a compulsion for mercantile par- 
ticipation in manufacturing finance. The incentive was the profit potential 
of trade in domestic products; the compulsion derived from the need to 
control large and dependable supplies in order to maintain control of trade 
s6 Correspondence, 1840-1850, Alan Wood Steel MSS; Correspon- 
dence, Iron Invoices, and Richard Borden to E. J. Sti&ney Company, Feb- 
ruary 18, 1848, Fall River Iron MSS, Baker Library, Harvard University. 
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flows that carried increasing quantities of manufactured products as the 
nineteenth century progressed. 
While entrepreneurs built the factories and devised ways to run them, 
merchants provided agencies of distribution and finance. Only the pre- 
existense of a prosperous, experienced, and efficient mercantile com- 
munity permitted such a rapid development of mass production in Amer- 
ica, for although many artisans perceived the great potential of expanding 
domestic markets, few of them possessed the capital or mercantile ex- 
pertise to take full advantage of the growing opportunities. Had early 
American producers been wholly dependent upon their own resources in 
operating their firms, or wholly dependent upon retained earnings in ex- 
panding them, the pace of industrialization would have been retarded. 
Merchants, however, drove the economy forward by supplying the needed 
capital and mercantile skills to the emerging industrial sector. 
Out of this symbiotic combination of old mercantile wealth and tal- 
ents, and new manufacturing technologies, emerged two of the pillars of 
American industrial maturity-the factory system that produced the 
goods, and the specialized institutions that financed their production and 
distribution. 
